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Web-based experimenta b s t r a c t
Many word forms map onto multiple meanings (e.g., ‘‘ace”). The current experiments
explore the extent to which adults reshape the lexical–semantic representations of such
words on the basis of experience, to increase the availability of more recently accessed
meanings. A naturalistic web-based experiment in which primes were presented within
a radio programme (Experiment 1; N = 1800) and a lab-based experiment (Experiment 2)
show that when listeners have encountered one or two disambiguated instances of an
ambiguous word, they then retrieve this primed meaning more often (compared with an
unprimed control condition). This word-meaning priming lasts up to 40 min after expo-
sure, but decays very rapidly during this interval. Experiments 3 and 4 explore longer-
term word-meaning priming by measuring the impact of more extended, naturalistic
encounters with ambiguous words: recreational rowers (N = 213) retrieved rowing-
related meanings for words (e.g., ‘‘feather”) more often if they had rowed that day, despite
a median delay of 8 hours. The rate of rowing-related interpretations also increased with
additional years’ rowing experience. Taken together these experiments show that individ-
uals’ overall meaning preferences reflect experience across a wide range of timescales from
minutes to years. In addition, priming was not reduced by a change in speaker identity
(Experiment 1), suggesting that the phenomenon occurs at a relatively abstract lexical–se-
mantic level. The impact of experience was reduced for older adults (Experiments 1, 3, 4)
suggesting that the lexical–semantic representations of younger listeners may be more
malleable to current linguistic experience.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
The ability to rapidly and accurately retrieve word
meanings is critical for successful language comprehen-
sion, but is particularly challenging for words with multi-
ple meanings. For example, when reading ‘‘the boy heardthe loud BARK”, the reader must determine that the final
word most likely refers to the sound made by a dog and
not the outer covering of a tree. Given that over 80% of
common English words have more than one dictionary
definition (Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2002), the
processes that enable readers/listeners to select appropri-
ate word meanings and reject contextually inappropriate
meanings form a core (and much studied) component of
the language comprehension system (Twilley & Dixon,
2000; Vitello & Rodd, 2015). The current experiments
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important, and previously underestimated, contribution to
the efficiency with which ambiguous words are processed.
We propose that lexical–semantic representations are
reshaped throughout our adult lives on the basis of our lin-
guistic experiences, such that information about how these
words have been used across a wide range of timescales,
from minutes to years, allows individuals to make better
predictions about which meanings are more likely to be
encountered in the future.
That the language system continues to be shaped by lin-
guistic input throughout adulthood is now well estab-
lished. Adult speakers can learn new word forms that
enter the language (e.g., ‘‘blog”; Gaskell & Dumay, 2003)
as well as new meanings for words they already know
(e.g., ‘‘twitter”; Rodd et al., 2012). In addition to these abil-
ities to learn new linguistic representations, an increasing
body of evidence has shown that adults are remarkably
skilled at ‘fine-tuning’ their existing linguistic representa-
tions to improve future comprehension. For example, adult
listeners can rapidly adapt to unfamiliar speech accents
(Adank, Evans, Stuart-Smith, & Scott, 2009; Bradlow &
Bent, 2008; Clarke & Garrett, 2004; Cristia et al., 2012)
and to the idiosyncratic pronunciation habits of unfamiliar
speakers (Mullennix, Pisoni, & Martin, 1989; Nygaard &
Pisoni, 1998). Similar retuning has also been observed at
the syntactic level, where past syntactic experience helps
listeners to predict upcoming words/phrases in sentence
comprehension (Arai, Van Gompel, & Scheepers, 2007;
Fine & Jaeger, 2013; Traxler, 2008). These adaptations at
different linguistic levels and at different timescales, which
retune listeners’ representations on the basis of experi-
ence, are now well established as making a critical contri-
bution to language comprehension. For instance,
adaptations to speech helps listeners’ ability to deal with
between-talker variability, allowing them to accurately
identify speech sounds that might otherwise have been
ambiguous (see Samuel & Kraljic, 2009 for a review) and
syntactic adaptions facilitate syntactic parsing and mean-
ing interpretation, hence improving comprehension flu-
ency (see Pickering & Ferreira, 2008, for a review).
However, it remains relatively unexplored whether people
also retune their lexical–semantic representations to lin-
guistic input in adulthood. The current experiments
explore the extent to which an adult’s lexical–semantic
representations can be reshaped by recent exposure, and
the time-course of these effects in different adult age
groups.
The ability to adapt to interlocutors’ linguistic represen-
tations is argued to result from automatic alignment at dif-
ferent linguistic levels during language communication:
interlocutors need to align their language systems in order
to build up a common ground, against which they can
accurately interpret words from each other’s speech and
meanings from each other’s words and sentences (e.g.,
Pickering & Garrod, 2004). For instance, it has been
observed that people assimilate each other’s accent, speech
rate and articulation during dialogue (Giles, Coupland, &
Coupland, 1991; Pardo, 2006); they gradually converge
on the same terms (e.g., ‘‘couch” or ‘‘sofa”) to refer to an
object (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986); and they tend torepeat each other’s syntactic structure in their utterances
(Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000; Cai, Pickering, &
Branigan, 2012). Though explicit attention may help inter-
locutors to align, most often, speakers and listeners can
align by implicitly learning from each other’s linguistic
input (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Thus, it may follow that
listeners may as well adapt their lexical–semantic repre-
sentations with their conversational partners or according
to their most recent experience. One typical example
where such lexical–semantic alignment may occur is the
interpretation of ambiguous words such as ‘‘gas” that have
multiple meanings: successful communication would
require a listener, for instance, to understand ‘‘gas” as
referring to fuel when it is used by an American English
speaker but as referring to an air-like fluid if it is used by
a British English speaker (see Cai et al., 2015, for a demon-
stration). Similarly, if a word such as ‘‘pitch” has been pre-
viously used to mean the playing field (e.g., by a
footballer/soccer player), or the throwing of a ball (e.g.,
by a baseball player) or as a musical-acoustic property
(e.g., by a musician), a competent listener might take such
recent experience into account when later interpreting the
word in the same conversation in order to be able to pro-
cess such word more accurately and fluently.
We therefore propose that the lexical–semantic repre-
sentations of adults remain sufficiently malleable that
our linguistic experiences can influence our interpretations
of such words at a range of different time-scales. First, we
suggest that our interpretations of such words are strongly
influenced by our most recent experience, within the last
few minutes. For example, a subordinate (low-frequency)
meaning (e.g., the animal enclosure meaning of ‘‘pen”)
might be relatively difficult to process the first time it
was encountered during a conversation, but that this initial
encounter would boost its subsequent availability making
it easier to process later in the conversation. On the
assumption that word-meanings are likely to be repeated
within natural conversations, this would facilitate access
of appropriate word meanings, relative to the situation
where these meaning preferences were highly stable and
only reflect the overall frequency of the meanings across
the listener’s whole lifetime. Specifically, listeners/readers
would be (i) faster to select the correct meaning on the
basis of sentence context and (ii) less likely to assign an
incorrect meaning. Given the ubiquity of lexical/semantic
ambiguity in language, such a mechanism could poten-
tially make a considerable contribution to the fluency of
natural language comprehension. Such an effect would be
akin to the processing enhancement seen for word recogni-
tion as a result of repetition priming, where words that
have been most recently encountered are more easily
recognised (See Wagenmakers, Zeelenberg, &
Raaijmakers, 2000, for discussion of relationship between
word frequency effects and repetition priming).
In addition, we propose that our linguistic experience
can shape our lexical–semantic representations at longer
time-scales, such that following repeated encounters with
a particular word meaning over a period of days/weeks/
years would increase the accessibility of that meaning rel-
ative to the word’s other meanings. This form of implicit
learning would allow us to adapt to the changes in
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ple, we move geographical location or take up a new
hobby. This would allow, for example, psychology
researchers to change over time their representations of
words like ‘‘significant” and ‘‘normal” as a consequence
of their experience with statistics.
Despite the intuitive appeal of the claim that experi-
ences at different timescales might shift our default inter-
pretations of ambiguous words, there is currently little
relevant evidence to support it. This is perhaps surprising
given the very large body of work looking at how ambigu-
ous words are processed and the importance given to these
words by the field in terms both of the challenge they pre-
sent to models of language comprehension and their utility
for testing key theoretical claims (see Twilley & Dixon,
2000; Vitello & Rodd, 2015).
Existing models of how such ambiguous words are pro-
cessed have instead focused on specifying the nature of the
processing mechanisms involved, and have converged on
the view that the alternative meanings of a word are ini-
tially retrieved in parallel, with the meaning that is most
compatible with the sentence context then being rapidly
selected (see Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988, for the influen-
tial re-ordered access model of semantic disambiguation,
and Twilley & Dixon, 2000, for a comprehensive review).
The field has also converged on the view that the relative
frequencies, also known as dominance, of the alternative
meanings play a key role in these processes, such that a
word’s most frequent (dominant) meaning is relatively
easy to process compared with any lower-frequency (sub-
ordinate) meanings. For example, when an ambiguous
word such as ‘‘spade” occurs in a constraining sentence
context (e.g., ‘‘The gambler/gardener picked up a SPADE”),
reading times are only longer when a relatively low-
frequency card-related meaning is used (e.g., Duffy et al.,
1988). In addition, when such words are preceded by a
neutral context, most readers will by default assign the
dominant meaning such that the reader/listener will sub-
sequently need to engage in a cognitively demanding rein-
terpretation process if the subordinate meanings turns out
to be required (e.g., ‘‘He picked up the SPADE but was hop-
ing for the ace of diamonds”; e.g., Rayner & Duffy, 1986;
Rodd, Johnsrude, & Davis, 2010). It is striking that the field
has consistently assumed that dominance, often explicitly
defined as ‘meaning frequency’, is the key determinant of
accessibility, implying that it is the overall frequency with
which a meaning has been encountered across our lifetime
that is the key determiner of meaning accessibility.
Although these models allow that the semantic context
in which a word occurs can influence availability, they
allow no specific role for recent experience with a particu-
lar word in determining its accessibility. Thus, according to
current models, the card-related meaning of ”spade”
would be more accessible within a conversation about
card-playing, but there would be no additional benefit in
the case where the listener had encountered the specific
word ‘‘spade” within this conversation.
Consistent with this emphasis on meaning frequency as
the key determinant of meaning availability, until very
recently there was no strong evidence to support the idea
that experiences with ambiguous words at relatively shorttimescales might also be important. Some evidence that
processing of a word meaning is facilitated when it is
encountered for the second time (relative to its other
non-repeated meaning) comes from a set of recognition
memory experiments (Light & Carter-Sobell, 1970), which
show better memory for an ambiguous word (e.g., JAM),
when it is presented with adjectives that disambiguate it
towards the same meaning on both the study and the test
trials (e.g., RASPBERRY JAM–STRAWBERRY JAM) compared
with a condition where the meaning changes between
study and test (e.g., RASPBERRY JAM–TRAFFIC JAM). How-
ever because participants were aware of the subsequent
memory test at the time of study, it is uncertain whether
such effects of exposure to a particular word meaning
would be seen in the absence of a deliberate attempt to
remember the ambiguous target words. Stronger evidence
on this issue comes from Binder and Morris (1995), who
found that the second encounter with an ambiguous word
within a paragraph of text was easier to process when the
same meaning was used in both occasions, compared to
when there was a switch in meaning. In addition there
have been several reports that lexical decisions to words
that are preceded by an ambiguous word (e.g., ‘‘bank-
money”) are faster when participants had previously
encountered a word pair that used the same meaning of
the ambiguous word compared to trials using a different
meaning (e.g., responses were faster following ‘‘bank-
save” than following ‘‘bank-stream”), indicating that on
the second presentation they were biased to retrieve the
previously primed meaning (Copland, 2006; Simpson &
Kang, 1994; Simpson & Kellas, 1989; see Masson &
Freedman, 1990; Bainbridge, Lewandowsky, & Kirsner,
1993, for similar demonstrations). However, in all these
experiments, priming was observed at a relatively short
delay (i.e. within a paragraph of text or a short block of iso-
lated words), and critically, it is possible that such priming
simply reflects a form of semantic priming rather than a
specific change in how a particular ambiguous word
should be interpreted. In other words the increased
availability of the primed meaning may result from a more
general boost for all words that fit with the preceding
semantic context, not a specific shift in how an individual
word should be interpreted.
The most direct evidence in support of this hypothesis
that recent experience has a significant impact on meaning
preferences comes from experiments using a novel ‘word-
meaning priming’ paradigm (Rodd, Lopez Cutrin, Kirsch,
Millar, & Davis, 2013). These experiments began with an
initial prime phase in which participants heard sentences
that contained fully disambiguated ambiguous words
(e.g., ‘‘The footballers were greeted warmly by the adoring
FANS”). About 20 min later, following an unrelated filler
task (digit span), participants then heard an ambiguous
word (e.g., ‘‘FAN”) for a second time, without a sentence
context, and made a word association response (e.g.,
SPORTS) to the ambiguous word, a task that indicates
which meaning of the ambiguous word participants
retrieved first. The results showed that, when an ambigu-
ous word had been disambiguated towards a particular
meaning about 20 min earlier, participants gave 30–40%
more responses consistent with the primed meaning. For
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respond to ‘‘FAN” with ‘‘sports” or ‘‘tennis” and less likely
to respond with associates like ‘‘cooling” or ‘‘summer” that
relate to its alternative meaning, indicating that the
primed meaning had become more accessible.
It is important to emphasise that word-meaning prim-
ing does not correspond to a form of semantic priming –
at this relatively long delay (20 min) there was no impact
on how ‘‘FAN” was interpreted in the word association task
following a semantic priming control sentence (e.g., when
the word ‘‘SUPPORTER” was used in place of ‘‘FAN” in the
prime sentence”). The absence of semantic priming indi-
cates that this phenomenon of ‘word-meaning’ priming
reflects the modulation of the accessibility of a specific
word meaning, most likely by direct changes to the con-
nections between a word’s input (phonological) represen-
tation and one of its semantic representations, such that
each encounter with a particular word meaning strength-
ens the connection between its word form and this mean-
ing, making the primed meaning for that specific word
more readily available for subsequent processing even
after a relatively long delay (Rodd et al., 2013).
This word-meaning priming effect was modulated by
the baseline dominance of the meaning such that strongly
subordinate meanings showed particularly strong changes.
For example, very strongly subordinate meanings showed
a fivefold increase in the likelihood of being retrieved after
a single encounter during the prime phase (e.g., from 2% to
10%; see Rodd et al., 2013; Fig. 1b). Dominant word mean-
ings, in contrast, showed little change in accessibility as a
consequence of priming. Intermediate between these two
extremes, Rodd et al. (2013) observed that priming can
act to change listeners’ preferences: word meanings that
were (on average) moderately subordinate (average domi-
nance of 26%) can be boosted by a single previous exposure
to such an extent that they come close to being equally
preferred to the alternative meaning (average dominance
of 40%). Although the consequence of this priming has
not yet been measured for online measures of reading flu-
ency, these priming effects are of a magnitude that are
likely to have a marked impact on how ambiguous words
are processed within sentence contexts. For example,
according to current models of semantic disambiguation
(e.g., the reordered access model; Duffy, Kambe, &
Rayner, 2001; Duffy et al., 1988), readers have particular
difficulty accessing the subordinate meaning of an ambigu-
ous word even when the word occurs in a context that
biases towards the subordinate meaning, presumably
because readers have to engage in a time-consuming com-
petition process with the contextually inappropriate dom-
inant meaning. In contrast, readers have little difficulty in
processing a word with relatively balanced alternative
meanings regardless of which meaning the context biases
towards because both meanings are somewhat equally
accessible. As a boost in dominance via recent exposure
can render a previously subordinate meaning to behave
as a balanced meaning, therefore facilitating semantic
interpretation when the same meaning is intended (as
more often than not) in subsequent text/speech, word-
meaning priming may serve a crucial function of improv-
ing comprehension fluency in reading/communication.However, it should be noted that, while the word-
meaning priming experiments reported in Rodd et al.
(2013) provide clear evidence that recent experience has
significant impact on the accessibility of word meanings,
several key empirical questions remain.
First, unlike repetition priming effects in word recogni-
tion, which have been studied at a range of different delay
intervals, and have been shown to persist on some word
recognition tasks for delays of up to 8 days (see Woltz &
Shute, 1995), all we currently know about the time-
course of word-meaning priming is that it can be observed
up to a delay of 20 min (Rodd et al., 2013). In addition,
while the observed priming effect was numerically larger
after a 3-min delay compared with a 20-min delay, this dif-
ference in priming magnitude was not significant (Rodd
et al., 2013). Thus it is unclear how the priming effect
changes over time. One key aim of the present research
is to map out the time-course of word meaning priming.
One possibility is that this phenomenon is relatively
short-lived and does not significantly endure beyond the
20-min time window that has been observed to date
(Rodd et al., 2013). This would suggest that the effect is
being driven by short-lived changes to the accessibility of
an individual meaning, and that these short-term changes
have little or no consequence for the more stable meaning
preferences (i.e. dominance) that endure beyond this time
window. An alternative outcome is that word-meaning
priming effects may persist significantly beyond 20 min,
with the impact of encountering an individual word mean-
ing having impact on preferences several hours, or perhaps
even days/weeks/months, later. Such a finding would have
important consequences for our understanding of the rela-
tive contributions of different types of experiences to our
ability to understand these words under natural listening
conditions and would impact on theoretical claims about
the degree of plasticity within the adult lexicon. This
finding would also place important theoretical constraints
on the underlying psychological mechanism: if word-
meaning priming persists for hours or days, then it is unli-
kely to reflect transient changes to accessibility due to
residual activation of a lexical–semantic representation of
the type thought to underlie semantic priming, but would
more likely reflect substantive long-term changes to the
connectivity within the lexical semantic network (see
Rodd et al., 2013; see also Bock & Griffin, 2000, for a similar
argument concerning structural priming). Finally, accord-
ing to the most extreme version of this account, our overall
preferences for words meanings may be entirely governed
by our relatively recent experiences, with longer-term
experience having no impact on current preferences. Under
this extreme view, a dominant meaning (e.g., the writing
implement meaning of ‘‘PEN”) would (on average) be more
accessible than its subordinate counterpart, not because
participants have all encountered it more often over their
lifetime, but because, on average across participants, it is
more likely to have been encountered within the preced-
ing hours/days. Distinguishing between these possible
accounts of howwordmeanings preferences arise, requires
us to map out the impact of experiences with word mean-
ings over a range of different timescales ranging from min-
utes (Experiments 1 & 2) to years (Experiments 3 & 4).
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word-meaning priming might be modulated by a partici-
pant’s age. The general issue of how comprehension pro-
cesses change with age has recently been of considerable
interest to researchers (see Burke & Shafto, 2008, for a
review), but studies of aging have tended to focus on
how the processing mechanisms themselves change with
age (e.g., age-related slowing of processing), and not on
the nature of the representations that are used by compre-
henders of different ages and how these might be differently
affected by experience (but see Ramscar, Hendrix, Shaoul,
Milin, & Baayen, 2014, for a notable exception). Although
some previous work has suggested that older adults can
become impaired in their ability to rapidly use sentence con-
text to modulate the processing of ambiguous words
(Dagerman, MacDonald, & Harm, 2006) and, more generally,
can become impaired on the ability to make use of sentential
context to guide semantic processing (Federmeier & Kutas,
2005), it is currently unknown whether there are age-
related changes in the abilities of older adults to use experi-
ence to facilitate processing of ambiguous words.
If it is indeed the case that our current preferences for
particular word meanings reflect the combination of recent
and long-term experience, then we might expect effects of
recent experience to be reduced in older participants, who
have more extensive lexical experience with these words,
and so might plausibly place less weight on more recent
encounters. This prediction of reduced word-meaning
priming in older individuals might also arise from a gen-
eral claim that older adults have reduced sensitivity to
linguistic experience. For example, perceptual learning stud-
ies have shown that although older adults can show percep-
tual learning on a range of different experimental paradigms
(e.g., Golomb, Peelle, & Wingfield, 2007), they can differ to
younger adults in terms of (i) the magnitude of perceptual
learning (Scharenborg & Janse, 2013), (ii) the degree of ben-
efit from extended training (Adank & Janse, 2010; Peelle &
Wingfield, 2005), and (iii) the level of transfer of this learn-
ing to novel stimuli (Peelle & Wingfield, 2005). There is also
evidence of reduced repetition priming in older adults com-
pared with young adults (Davis et al., 1990; Fleischman
et al., 1999; Meiran & Jelicic, 1995). Thus a reduction in
word-meaning priming in older listeners could be predicted
on the basis that this group may have a relatively pervasive
reduction in the efficiency of the learning/priming mecha-
nisms that are more efficiently recruited by younger listen-
ers as a way of optimising their comprehension on the basis
of recent experiences.
A final area of uncertainty, with respect to the mecha-
nism underlying word-meaning priming, is the role of epi-
sodic memory. Thus far, we have described word-meaning
priming as reflecting changes to stored lexical–semantic
representations. However, an alternative explanation is
that the underlying lexical–semantic representations
remain unchanged after an encounter with an ambiguous
word, and that the previously observed priming effect
reflects a (short-lived) influence of episodic representa-
tions of the prime sentences. Under this view, when partic-
ipants hear an ambiguous word in the word association
task they recall episodic information associated with their
earlier encounter with the relevant prime sentence andthis biases them to retrieve information related to the pre-
viously encountered meaning. Under this account, the
priming effect could potentially lie outside of the mental
lexicon, allowing our model of lexical processing to retain
the idea that the underlying meaning preferences as stored
in the lexicon are highly stable and not susceptible to large
changes on the basis of recent experience. This episodic
account was, to some extent, ruled out by Rodd et al.
(2013; Experiment 2). Rodd et al. argued that if episodic
representations were driving priming then the strength
of priming should be modulated by the degree of percep-
tual overlap between the training and test exemplars. In
particular, priming should be maximal when the training
sentences and test words were spoken by the same person,
and be reduced when there is clear mismatch between the
speakers (i.e. female vs. male; see Luce & Lyons, 1998;
Jackson & Morton, 1984, for similar arguments with
respect to repetition priming). Rodd et al. (2013) found
no significant effect of voice change, with comparable
priming effects in both same-voice and different-voice
conditions, suggesting that episodic factors are not critical.
This null effect of speaker identify was consistent with the
view that word-meaning priming effect reflects a modula-
tion of the connection between a relatively abstract phono-
logical representation of its form to its meaning as,
according to most models of speech comprehension, this
type of perceptual detail is not preserved at these relatively
abstract levels of representation (Luce & Lyons, 1998;
Orfanidou, Davis, Ford, & Marslen-Wilson, 2011).
However, this finding needs revisiting for two reasons.
First, given the importance of the finding from a theoretical
point of view, it is important to replicate what is essen-
tially a null result. Second, we must rule out the possibility
that this observed null result was a consequence of listen-
ers not retaining information about the identity of these
unfamiliar speakers within their episodic representations
of the prime sentences. In Experiment 1, we address this
issue by making use of familiar speakers, for which it is
more likely that this information will be both salient at
the time of exposure, and subsequently retained.
The current experiments address these three critical
issues: the time-course of priming, and the possible effects
of speaker identity and listener age. Importantly, these
experiments are, where possible, conducted in a more nat-
uralistic listening environment compared with the earlier
word-meaning priming experiments (Rodd et al., 2013).
In Experiment 1 we examine the time-course of word
meaning priming in a situation where participants obtain
minimal experience with the ambiguous words: partici-
pants heard just one or two instances of the ambiguous
word primes within a radio programme and then com-
pleted a web-based experiment to measure their meaning
preferences for these ambiguous words. In Experiment 2
we then replicate some key findings from Experiment 1
within a more tightly controlled lab-based experiment. In
Experiments 3 and 4 we explore the impact of more exten-
sive (i.e. days/months/years), real-world experience with
ambiguous words, by measuring how participants’ recent
and long-term participation in a particular sporting hobby
(rowing) influenced their preferences for words used
within this sporting context.
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The current experiment aims to replicate the word-
meaning priming effect, first shown by Rodd et al. (2013)
in a more naturalistic listening environment. In addition,
it addresses three key questions about word-meaning
priming. First, we explore the time-course of word-
meaning priming. Previous experiments (Rodd et al.,
2013) tested word-meaning priming only at delays of both
3 and 20 min and found a non-significant numerical
decline in priming between these time points. Here we
measure priming in a much larger set of participants
(N = 1800) using prime–target delays ranging from a few
minutes to several days in order to map out the time-
course of this priming effect more comprehensively.
Second, we explore the specificity of this form of priming –
do listeners generalise more readily from an individual
encounter with an ambiguous word to subsequent
instances of the target word spoken by the same familiar
speaker compared to instances where a different familiar
speaker is used, or is this form of lexical–semantic priming
immune to effects of speaker identity? Finally we explore
the extent to which word-meaning priming is modulated
by age.
These requirements for (i) a naturalistic listening envi-
ronment, (ii) speakers who were highly familiar to partici-
pants, and (iii) a relatively long delay between prime and
test are hard to achieve within conventional lab-based
experiments.We therefore conducted the experiment in col-
laboration with BBC Radio 4, a British radio station. Specifi-
cally we worked with ‘‘The Human Zoo”, a scientific
programme which covers a range of psychological topics
and aims to ‘‘discover the way we think, behave and make
decisions” (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01r6j16).
A key advantage of this approach is that the large number
of participants that can be recruited compensates for the
high level of noise in data from the word association task
in which responses are influenced by numerous idiosyn-
cratic aspects of a person’s individual experiences.
The prime phase of the experiment was conducted on
live radio: listeners heard well-known radio presenters
read short scripts that contained multiple, fully disam-
biguated ambiguous words. We then collected word asso-
ciation responses from listeners by asking them to log on
to our website and complete a web-based word association
task. By allowing listeners to complete this task at any time
within the following week we could explore how their
responses varied as a function of the delay between listen-
ing to the broadcast programme and completing the online
task. Importantly, we used two familiar speakers during
the prime phase and then systematically varied the voice
used during the word association task in order assess
whether priming was reduced when there was a mismatch
in speaker identity between prime and test.Materials and method
Participants
Participants were recruited live on air on the Radio 4
programme ‘‘The Human Zoo”, which was broadcastthroughout the UK. Listeners were invited to go to the
programme website (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/
b01r6j16) and to follow the link to the experiment website.
To recruit additional participants who had not listened to
the programme, the link was also circulated via social
media using the first author’s twitter account (@JenniR-
odd). The link to the experiment was active for seven days
after the programme was broadcast. A total of 4035 partic-
ipants clicked on the link that initiated the experiment. Of
these, 2560 completed the experiment. Of those that did
not complete the experiment, the majority (68%) dropped
out very early in the experiment before the first task had
begun, most likely because they did not have the facility
to listen to sound or were not in a quiet listening environ-
ment. Only those participants who completed the entire
experiment were included in the analysis. One participant
was removed because they indicated that they were under
17, and 34 participants were removed because they
answered ‘‘no” to the question ‘‘Is English the language
that you use most often?”. Of the 2525 remaining partici-
pants (69.6% female; age 17–83; mean age = 52.0) 96.5%
said that English was the language that they had learned
first as a child, 95.0% said they had lived most of their life
in the UK and 8.2% said that they considered themselves to
be bilingual. Participants who took longer than 30 min to
complete the experiment were then excluded (421 partic-
ipants; 16.7%) as they were likely to have taken breaks dur-
ing the experiment or have not fully engaged with the task.
The remaining participants took an average of 24 min to
complete the experiment (range: 8–30 min). We then
excluded all participants who indicated that they had not
listened to Episode 5 when it was broadcast but instead
had listened via the BBC’s iPlayer service (N = 259, 12.3%)
as we were not confident that they would have accurately
reported the time at which they had listened to the pro-
gramme. An additional 45 participants (2.4%) were
excluded because they made more than 25% ‘‘error”
responses on the meaning verification task, indicating that
they are either mishearing these words or were somewhat
uncertain about how to respond. After all these exclusion
criteria had been applied 1800 participants were included
in the final analysis.Materials
The four prime paragraphs (38–58 words in length)
were short descriptions of fictional characters containing
seven fully disambiguated target ambiguous words that
had at least two clearly distinct meanings (Appendix A).
Where possible the lower frequency meaning was used
(based on dominance scores from Rodd et al., 2013 and
other pretests that used the same procedure). Half the tar-
get ambiguous words only appeared once in the script,
while the other half appeared twice. Each participant heard
all 28 ambiguous words without sentence context in the
word association and meaning verification tasks (see pro-
cedure) together with one initial filler word that was not
included in the analysis. All the paragraphs and isolated
words were recorded by two different well-known journal-
ists/presenters on BBC Radio 4 (Edward Stourton (ES) and
Jenni Murray (JM)).
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The prime paragraphs were broadcast within Episode 5
of the 2013 series of BBC Radio 4’s ‘‘The Human Zoo”. This
episode focused on the influence of various factors in our
environment on human decision making. There was no dis-
cussion of semantic ambiguity or any other topic related to
this experiment. At the very end of the episode, the presen-
ter (Michael Blastland) told the audience that he wanted
them to participate in a memory experiment. They were
instructed to listen carefully to some short clips and then
to listen to the programme the following week to find
out something interesting about their memory. The audi-
ence then heard each of the four prime paragraphs in turn,
each spoken only once by one of the two well-known pre-
senters in alternating order. The names of the presenters
were not mentioned. The audience were then requested
by one of the authors (JMR) to go to the programme web-
site to participate in an experiment. They were told that
the results from this experiment would be presented the
following week. The link between the prime paragraphs
and the online experiment was not mentioned.
An online survey tool (www.qualtrics.com) was used to
present the main experiment. After indicating their con-
sent to take part in the experiment, participants were
instructed to listen to a single word spoken by one of the
authors (JMR) and were instructed to adjust the volume
of their speakers/headphones until they could hear it
clearly. If they indicated that they could not hear it clearly
then the experiment ended. They then input their age and
gender, and answered yes/no to a series of questions about
their language background. They then took part in two
tasks: (i) word association; (ii) meaning verification.
Word association
Participants heard a list of words and were instructed
after each word to type the first word that they associated
with the word that they had just heard. The first word was
a filler item, not included in the analysis, followed by each
of the 28 primed ambiguous words presented in a different
random order for each participant. Each participant heard
all 29 words spoken in the same voice (i.e. either ES or
JM, counterbalanced across participants such that the same
number of participants took part in each version), such
that half the words were presented in the same voice as
in the prime, but each item appeared in both the same-
and different-voice conditions, across participants. They
were then asked to type in any thoughts that they had
about the aim of the experiment, and were asked to reply
‘‘yes”, ‘‘maybe” or ‘‘no” to the question ‘‘Did you recognise
the speaker”. For those participants who indicated ‘‘yes” or
‘‘maybe” they were asked to give any information that they
could about the speaker and were asked to indicate ‘‘yes”,
‘‘maybe” or ‘‘no” to the question ‘‘Do you know the name of
this person?”. Finally, all participants were asked to guess
the name of the speaker. Before starting the next stage of
the experiment, participants were asked whether they
had listened to Episode 5 of the Human Zoo (i.e. the epi-
sode that contained the primes) (i) live as it was broadcast,
(ii) at a later time via BBC’s iPlayer service (which allows
listeners to listen to programmes on demand), or (iii) not
at all.Meaning verification
The aim of this task was for participants to code their
own earlier word association responses according to which
meaning had been retrieved. In conventional word associ-
ation dominance tests (e.g., Twilley, Dixon, Taylor, & Clark,
1994) this coding phase is done by the experimenters, but
this approach was impractical for the large number of par-
ticipants tested here. For each of the 29 items participants
heard the ambiguous word again and saw their own word
association response together with two short definitions of
the ambiguous word’s meanings – the meaning used in the
paragraph and its most frequent alternative meaning. They
were instructed to select the meaning that they had in
mind when they had made their association response.
These definitions were presented in the same order for
each item across participants, with the paragraph meaning
being given first on half of the items. A third ‘‘other mean-
ing” option was to be selected if they had been thinking of
a different meaning. A final ‘‘error” option was to be




Each participant was asked if they recognised the
speaker that they had heard during the test phase of the
experiment. 33% of the 415 participants who listened to
ES during the experiment indicated that they recognised
his voice. Within this subset 29% correctly identified ES,
36% indicated that they knew it was a Radio 4 presenter
from a news/current affairs programme but were either
unable to recall his name or gave the name of a different
Radio 4 presenter associated with similar current affairs
programmes, 32% of this subset did not give a specific
name but responded with a vague (but correct answer)
such as ‘‘Radio 4 presenter”, and the remaining 3%
answered incorrectly, identifying the speaker as someone
not associated with Radio 4 news programmes (e.g., the
main presenter of the Human Zoo). 27% of the 344 of par-
ticipants who listened to JM’s voice indicated that they
recognised her voice. Within this subset 72% correctly
identified JM, 8% indicated that they knew it was a presen-
ter fromWomen’s Hour but were either unable to generate
her name or gave the name of a different presenter from
this programme, 11% of this subset did not give a specific
name or responded with a vague (but correct answer) such
as ‘‘Radio 4 presenter”, and the remaining 8% answered
incorrectly, identifying the speaker as someone not associ-
ated with Women’s Hour (e.g., a Radio 4 newsreader or
continuity announcer). These responses indicate that many
(but not all) participants were sufficiently familiar with the
talkers to be explicitly aware of their identity.
Word association/meaning verification
392 participants indicated that they had not listened to
the programme and so served as an unprimed control
group. The remaining 1408 indicated that they had lis-
tened to the programme live and were categorised in terms
of which day they had completed the experiment. 5 am
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Fig. 1. Experiment 1: Proportion of trials on which participants generated
a word association response that was related to the primed meaning.
3 An alternative approach would have been to estimate delay based on
both the start time and end time of the experiment, but this would
J.M. Rodd et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 87 (2016) 16–37 23the experiment before 5 am on the morning after the pro-
gramme was broadcast was considered to have completed
it on ‘Day 1’, whereas participants who started the experi-
ment after 5 am were considered to have completed it on
‘‘Day 2”. The same 5 am cut-off was used for the bound-
aries between subsequent days. The majority of the partic-
ipants who completed the experiment after listening to the
programme, completed it on Day 1 (N = 974; 69.2%). 289
participants completed it on Day 2 (20.5%), and 145 com-
pleted it on Days 3–8 (10.3%).
For each participant/item within each of these four
groups we calculated the proportion of the total meaning
verification responses on which they had indicated that
they had retrieved the meaning of the ambiguous word
that was used in the prime paragraphs (Fig. 1). The highest
rate of primed responses was for the participants who
completed the experiment on Day 1, whereas participants
who performed the experiment on later days were similar
to the unprimed control group (whose performance
reflects the baseline (unprimed) dominance of these mean-
ings). ANOVAs showed that the proportion of primed
responses varied significantly across these four groups
(F1(3,1792) = 8.7, p < .001, g2p = .01; F2(3,81) = 6.7, p < .001,
g2p = .20).1 Pairwise comparisons between each of these four
groups (using a Bonferroni corrected significance level of
p < .008), confirmed that the unprimed condition only dif-
fered significantly from participants who listened to the pro-
gramme on Day 1 (F1(1,1362) = 21.8, p < .001; F2(1,27)
= 18.0, p < .001). The only difference between the different
priming groups that was significant in both analyses was
the contrast between the participants who listened on Day
1 and those that listened on Day 2 (F1(1,1259) = 7.5,
p = .006; F2(1,27) = 12.4, p = .002). The difference between
Days 1 and 3 only reached corrected significance only in
the items analysis (F1(1,1115) = 5.1, p = .025; F2(1,27)
= 9.4, p = .005). All other pairwise comparisons were not sig-
nificant (p > .1). In summary, these initial analyses show that
that there is significant priming on Day 1, but this priming
effect is significantly reduced by Day 2 and is not significant
on this (and later) days.
Given that significant priming effects were restricted to
participants who completed the experiment on Day 1, we
then explored the performance of this group (N = 973) in
more detail using a simultaneous multiple regression
approach.2 The two predictors of interest were (i) the delay,
measured in minutes, between the prime paragraphs and
the onset of the experiment and (ii) participant age. The
prime-test delay was estimated for each participant as the
difference between the midpoint of the prime paragraphs
and the time at which they started the experiment (as mea-
sured automatically by the survey software). Given the
mean duration of the online experiment (24 min) and the
assumption (based on experience with these tasks within
the lab) that participants spent approximately half this time1 Version was included in these (and where appropriate in subsequent
analyses), but main effects and interactions involving version are not
(Pollatsek & Well, 1995).
2 One participant was removed from this analysis as they entered an age
of over 500. Given their other responses this was taken to be a one-off typo
and they were retained in all other analyses.on the word association task and half on the verification
task, we estimated the average midpoint of the word associ-
ation task relative to the start of the experiment as 6 min,
which was then added to the delay estimates for all partic-
ipants (see Rodd et al., 2013, for similar approach).3
To make the results easier to interpret, we subtracted
from all responses the baseline rate of responding from
the unprimed control group (31.7%), such that the depen-
dent measure was the priming effect. A positive number
reflected an increased probability of retrieving a primed
meaning. As we did not have strong predictions about
the precise nature of the relationships between delay (t)
and the proportion of primed meanings that were recalled
(P), we assessed several alternative models: (i) a linear
relationship (P = b0 + b1t); a logarithmic function (P = b0 +
b1 ln(t)); an inverse function (P = b0 + b1/t); a power func-
tion (P = b0 + tb1); an exponential function (P = b0 + eb1t).
Although all of these functions were significantly corre-
lated with the proportion of primed responses (all
ps < .008), the best model fit was provided by the logarith-
mic model (P = 5.25 + (0.83 ⁄ ln(t)); R2 = .021, F = 20.8,
p < .001).4 A stepwise regression approach confirmed that
none of the alternative functions made a significant addi-
tional contribution above the variance explained by the
logarithmic function (ps > .18). We then repeated these
steps for the predictor age (A). In this case the best fit was
provided by the linear model (P = 7.60  (0.087 ⁄ A)). The
combined regression model including both delay (log-
transformed) and age (linear) confirmed the significant
negative effects of both age (b = .07, t = 2.3; p = .021)
and delay (b = .13, t = 4.1; p < .001), such that there was
greater priming for younger participants and for participants
who completed the experiment at a shorter delay5
(P = 8.5  (0.75 ⁄ ln(t))  (0.065 ⁄ A)). Although these twointroduce a correlation between delay and the time-taken to complete the
experiment, which could introduce artefactual effects of delay on perfor-
mance if those participants who were slower on the task showed less
priming.
4 A series of F-tests showed no significant difference in the level of fit
given by these different models (p > .4).
5 The interaction term between these two variables was non-significant





































Fig. 2. Experiment 1: Predicted values from regression analysis (solid
lines) as a function of variation in (i) delay between prime and test and (ii)
participant age. In both cases these are plotted at median values of other
predicted variables. Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals
for these predicted values.
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other (r = .187, p < .001) reflecting the fact that older partic-
ipants tended to wait longer before starting the experiment,
but there was no evidence of serious collinearity in these
data (variable inflation factor (VIF) = 1.5; O’Brien, 2007).
The nature of these relationships is shown in Fig. 2.
Finally, to assess whether there was a significant effect
of voice-congruency (i.e., more priming for the same-voice
condition compared with the different-voice condition),
we calculated for each participant the difference between
these two conditions, which we refer to as the same-
voice benefit. Across this large set of participants the mean
same-voice benefit was small and negative (mean = 0.5%;
SD = 18.4), indicating that there was no priming increase
when the voice was kept constant between prime and test.
This absence of an effect was confirmed by a multiple
regression (including both age and log-transformed delay)
using the same-voice benefit as the dependent measure. In
this analysis both the constant and the main effect of delay
(log transformed) were not significant (ps > .15), confirm-
ing that there was no main effect of voice-congruency, or
interaction between voice-congruency and delay. To explore
the possibility that a voice-congruency effect might be
modulated by the listeners’ familiarity with the speakers,
we repeated the above analysis using only those participants
who answered ‘‘yes” to the question ‘‘Do you recognise the
speaker”6 (N = 352). Again the overall mean ‘benefit’ in this
group was small and negative (mean = 0.03%; SD = 18.7)
and the constant and effect of delay in the regression analysis
were non-significant (ps > .7).Awareness of experiment aims
We manually coded the responses of the 973 partici-
pants included in the regression analysis. 58.5% either gave
no response or explicitly stated that they had no idea of the
aim, 28.0% gave a response unrelated to the true aim (e.g.
suggesting that we were exploring effects of age, gender,
culture, experiences, political affiliations or social class on
how people interpret words, or suggesting that this was
a study into techniques used in advertising, which was
the subject of the Human Zoo episode they had just lis-
tened to. Only 13.6% of participants indicated an aware-
ness of the link between some of the words and the
prime paragraphs. The main regression analysis was
repeated excluding the ‘aware’ participants. The effects of
both delay (log-transformed) and age (linear) remained
significant for this subset (b = .08, t = 2.4; p = .017) and
delay (b = .13, t = 3.9; p < .001).Discussion
These results from this experiment provide clear
answers to all our initial research questions.6 Note that caution must be taken when selecting participants on their
knowledge of the specific speakers as this can bias sampling of participants
differently for the two speakers. However, in this case it seemed unlikely
that groups selected on the basis of their knowledge of these two speakers
would differ in their baseline dominance in a way that would be consistent
across this set of 28 words, which were not selected to be closely linked to
the likely topics that would be associated with these two speakers.Word-meaning priming was observed under relatively nat-
ural conditions and was significantly modulated by both
time and age, such that it was enhanced at short durations
and for younger participants. The effect of delay on prim-
ing was striking (see Fig. 2). For example, participants
who completed the word association task after just 6 min
had an estimated priming magnitude of 6.2% (see Fig. 2),
reflecting an increase in the proportion of responses that
were related to the primed meaning from a baseline rate
of 31.7% to 37%. It is worth emphasizing that this absolute
increase in primed responses of 6.2% reflects a proportional
increase in the likelihood that a primed meaning is gener-
ated of 20%. This priming effect was strongly modulated by
the delay between the prime and test, such that priming esti-
mates were reduced to an absolute change of just 1% after a
delay of about 3 h. The modulatory effect of age on priming
magnitude was equally striking, such that at the median
delay of 13min, the estimated effect for participants aged
20 was 5.3%, but this was reduced to an estimated effect of
just 2.0% for participants aged 70. In contrast to these clear
effects of delay and age, word-meaning priming was not
influenced by a change in speaker identity between prime
and test: the mean priming for the same-voice condition
was in fact numerically (though non-significantly) less than
that seen in the different-voice condition.
These findings confirm that short-term priming effects
are likely to contribute to listeners’ ability to understand
ambiguous words in context in the situation where they
have already encountered that word within a conversation.
The wider theoretical implications of these three key
findings for current theories of language comprehension
will be explored in detail in the General discussion.
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meaning priming decays relatively rapidly with time dur-
ing the first hour after an encounter with an ambiguous
word, one weakness of this experiment is that it used a
between-participant design in which the experimenters
had no control over the delay with which participants took
part in the experiment. Thus it is possible that the individ-
uals who chose to wait longer before completing the word
association task differed systematically from those who
participated more immediately. For example, the ‘long-
delay’ participants might have been generally less inter-
ested in the experiment and their lower levels of priming
could potentially reflect a less attentive listening attitude
during the prime sentences. Given the non-significant
effect of delay seen in the earlier lab-based study of
word-meaning priming (Rodd et al., 2013), it is important
to replicate this finding that priming decays with time dur-
ing the first hour after exposure using a within-participant
design in a more conventional lab-based experiment.Experiment 2
This experiment uses a modified version of the lab-
based word-meaning priming paradigm introduced by
Rodd et al. (2013) in which participants hear individual
prime sentences that contain an ambiguous word that is
disambiguated towards its subordinate meaning by the
context (e.g., ‘‘The pig PEN was muddier than ever.”). The
impact of these primes on the target ambiguous word
(e.g., PEN) is measured on a subsequent word association
task. In the experiments reported by Rodd et al. (2013)
the prime sentences were presented in a separate block
from the test words, resulting in a relatively long minimum
time between each individual prime sentences and its
corresponding word association trial (3 min). In addition,
individual randomisations of both the prime sentences
and the target words within these blocks resulted in
variable delays between each individual prime sentence
and its corresponding word association trial, depending
on whether these occurred towards the beginning/end of
these two blocks. In order to reduce the between-item
variation in delay and to measure priming at a wider range
of delays, Experiment 2 comprised three blocks of trials,
which all contained both primes and targets, presented
in alternation. In this modified version of the paradigm,
participants only made responses to the isolated words,
but were instructed to listen carefully to all the stimuli that
they heard. Participants heard all prime sentences in Block
1, and the subsequent word association trials were posi-
tioned in either Block 1, 2 or 3 so that they appeared
exactly either 1 min, 20 min or 40 min after their corre-
sponding prime sentence. Between the blocks participants
completed a non-linguistic filler task in order to allow for
the appropriate delay between prime and test.Materials and methods
Participants
51 native speakers of British English were recruited
from the University College London online recruitingsystem and were each paid £6 for their participation. Nine
participants were excluded due to technical problems
(software crash or problems recording verbal responses).
One participant was excluded for failing to adequately fol-
low instructions and one was excluded for a high number
of null responses on the word association task (49%).
Materials
274 target words were selected for use in the word
association task, of which 88 were ambiguous words
(Appendix B) and the rest unambiguous filler words (e.g.,
bread, thief). The ambiguous words were all chosen to have
a subordinate meaning (dominance range: 0–0.48;
mean = 0.24) that was semantically distinct from the
word’s dominant meaning (dominance range: 0.42–1;
mean = 0.70). These dominance scores were taken from a
variety of pretests that used the standard word association
method (Twilley et al., 1994) and the same participant
population as the main experiment. Most of the ambiguous
words were homonyms, which share both spelling and
pronunciation (e.g. ‘‘BARK”), but eight were non-
homographic homophones, which share only pronuncia-
tion (e.g., ‘‘FLOUR/FLOWER”).
88 experimental prime sentences were constructed in
which the initial part of the sentence strongly disam-
biguated the ambiguous word towards its subordinate
meaning (e.g., ‘‘The author put his memos in the APPENDIX
of the book”). An additional 166 filler sentences were con-
structed, which contained none of the ambiguous experi-
mental words. Another four pairs of sentences and words
were constructed as practice items. All these sentences
and words were spoken by a female speaker with a
Southern English accent (HB). Four lists of materials
were created for use in constructing the four versions of
the experiment (see Design).
Design
The experiment contained four conditions: three
primed conditions that varied in the delay between the
prime and target (1, 20 and 40 min) and an unprimed base-
line. Four versions of the experiment were created with the
88 experimental items being assigned to the four priming
conditions using a Latin-square design such that each word
was assigned to each of the four conditions across the
four versions. This ensured that each item occurred in
every condition (across participants), that all participants
contributed to all conditions, but that no participants
encountered any item more than once.
The stimuli were presented in three blocks of trials. The
first block contained all of the 88 experimental prime
sentences in the same random order for all participants,
except for the 22 sentences that were assigned to the
no-prime condition for each version, which were replaced
by filler sentences. The decision to keep the sentences for
all primed conditions within the first block ensured that
these prime sentences were equally well attended across
conditions. These 88 sentences were followed by an
additional 6 filler sentences at the end of the block, which
were required to maintain the alternation of sentences and
word association trials until all of the word association
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Fig. 3. Experiment 2: Illustration of the trial structure and experiment composition. The upper panel presents the trial structure and the lower panel the
experiment composition.
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order for all participants.
The word association target words were then posi-
tioned in such a way that a word always appeared exactly
1 min (i.e., 6 trials, one trial lasting for 10 s; see Procedure)
later than its corresponding prime sentence if the word
was assigned to the 1-min condition, 20 min (a block) later
if it was assigned to the 20-min condition, and 40 min (2
blocks) later if it was assigned to the 40-min condition
(see Fig. 3 for timing information). In other words, a target
word occurred in Block 1 under 1-min condition, in Block 2
in the 20-min condition and in Block 3 in the 40-min con-
dition. The target words in the no-prime condition were
spread across the three blocks (7 in Blocks 1 and 2; 8 in
Block 3). To ensure a strict alternation of sentence and
word trials throughout the whole experiment, filler words
were inserted into every slot within each block in which
an experimental target had not already been positioned.
Note that a target word never immediately followed its
corresponding prime sentence.Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a cubicle and
the experiment was run on E-Prime 2.0. After giving their
informed consent, a participant began the experiment with
a practice session. Each trial began with a screen with the
symbol ‘‘===” lasting for 3.5 s, during which a sentence was
played via headphones (Fig. 3a). The onset of the sound file
was aligned to the start of the 3.5 s period. After a short
delay (0.5 s) the symbol ‘‘+++” appeared for 5 s, during
which participants heard a word to which they verbally
gave an associate. The onset of the sound file was aligned
to the start of the 5 s period. Participants were told to give
the response as quickly as possible within the given time
window and that responses beyond that time window
would not be registered. The participants’ verbal responses
were recorded as individual sound files. The screen wasthen replaced with a blank screen lasting for 1 s as an
inter-trial interval. Thus, each trial lasted for 10 s in total.
As shown in Fig. 3b, the whole experiment consisted of
a practice session, Block 1 lasting for 15.7 min (94 trials),
Filler task 1 lasting for 4.3 min, Block 2 lasting for
14.7 min (88 trials), Filler task 2 lasting for 5.3 min, and
finally Block 3 lasting for 14.7 min (88 trials). After the
practice, all trials were presented according to a fixed time
schedule that did not vary across participants. The filler
tasks involved colouring pictures. Right before the end of
a filler task, participants heard beep sounds via their head-
phone, at which point they were required to stop colouring
and get ready for the next block of the experiment.
Results
The word association responses of each participant
were transcribed and coded, with each response coded as
referring to either (i) the dominant meaning of the homo-
phone, (ii) the subordinate meaning of the homophone
that was used in the prime sentence, (iii) another meaning,
or (iv) an error (e.g., the participant had misheard the
word, their response could not be clearly heard, or it was
unclear which meaning they had retrieved). The data were
initially divided into two sets, each coded by a single
experimenter (AA, HB). All these codes were then checked
by a third experimenter (JMR). The coders were all blind to
the prime condition that the word was assigned to.
For each participant/itemwithin each of these four prime
conditions, we calculated the proportion of trials on which
they had retrieved the meaning of the ambiguous word that
was used in the prime paragraphs as a proportion of the
total number of non-error trials (Fig. 4). The highest rate of
primed responses was for the 1-min condition. The 20-min
and 40-min conditions showed a somewhat lower rate of
primed responses, although this was still higher than that
seen in the unprimed baseline. ANOVAs showed that the


























Fig. 4. Experiment 2: The mean proportion of responses in each condition
that matched the primed meaning for each participant. Error bars are ±1
standard error away from the mean (subjects’ analysis).
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F2(3,252) = 14.5, p < .001, g2p = 0.35).7 Pairwise comparisons
among the four conditions (using a Bonferroni corrected sig-
nificance level of p < .008) confirmed that priming was pre-
sent in all three prime conditions: compared to the
unprimed condition, all the three priming conditions led to
significantly more retrievals of the primed meanings
(1-min condition: F1(1,84) = 40.0, p < .001, g2p = 0.53;
F2(1,36) = 39.9, p < .001, g2p = 0.32; 20 min condition:
F1(1,84) = 18.8, p < .001, g2p = 0.34; F2(1,36) = 13.7, p < .001,
g2p = 0.14; 40-min condition: F1(1,84) = 16.7, p < .001,
g2p = 0.32; F2(1,36) = 12.5, p < .001, g2p = 0.14). In addition,
the reduction in priming between the 1-min condition and
the 40-min condition was significant: (F1(1,84) = 11.8,
p < .001, g2p = 0.25; F2(1,36) = 7.9, p < .006, g2p = 0.09). The
reduction in priming between the 1-min condition and the
20 min condition was significant at corrected level of signif-
icance in the subjects analysis and at an uncorrected level in
the items analysis (F1(1,84) = 7.8, p < .008, g2p = 0.32;
F2(1,36) = 4.8, p < .03, g2p = 0.06). The difference between
the 20- and 40-min conditions was not significant
(F1(1,84) = 0.1, p = .73, g2p = 0.003; F2(1,36) = 0.42, p = .52,
g2p = 0.005).Discussion
The results of this experiment replicate the reduction
in word-meaning priming that was observed during the
first hour after exposure in Experiment 1, under more
tightly controlled lab-based conditions using a within-
participants design: there were significantly fewer primed
responses given after a 40 min delay (28%), compared to
the 1-min delay condition (35%; Fig. 4). This suggests that
the reduction in priming in Experiment 1 was not an arte-
fact of the between-participant design and that word-
meaning priming does decay within the first hour. How-
ever, despite this reduction, even after 40 min the primed
condition was significantly different to the unprimed con-
dition (20%) and the absence of a difference between the
20-min and 40-min conditions, which were numerically
very similar (28.2%, 27.8%), indicates that priming is7 Version was included in these, but main effects and interactions
involving version are not (Pollatsek & Well, 1995).relatively stable within this time window. This pattern of
priming – a relatively rapid decay that occurs at some
point within the first 20 min, followed by a more stable
component – is broadly consistent with the logarithmic
decay function that was found in Experiment 1. We return
to the theoretical implications of this time-course in the
General Discussion.
Despite the clarity of the results from these two exper-
iments, several unanswered questions remain. In particu-
lar, while Experiments 1 and 2 have clearly shown that
relatively recent experience can have a marked impact on
listeners’ preferences for a particular word meaning,
Experiment 2 only studied the effect at a maximum delay
of 40 min and Experiment 1 suggests that the impact of
just one or two encounters with a word are relatively small
beyond the first hour after exposure. Thus we have no
evidence concerning how or when listeners make use of
their own experiences with ambiguous words to alter their
long-term preferences for their different meanings. We
cannot yet be certain about how (and indeed if) these
relatively short-term priming effects relate to longer-
term changes in meaning preferences that endure for days,
months, or even years. These longer-term changes in
meaning preference will be explored in Experiments 3
and 4.Experiment 3
One experimental approach to the study of how prefer-
ences for word meanings change in the longer-term (i.e.
over days/months/years) within a relatively naturalistic
setting is to explore the preferences of participants with
atypical linguistic experience, whose preferences for par-
ticular meanings are likely to differ from the population
as a whole. Studies that explore the consequence of partic-
ipants’ specific types of exposure to language outside of the
lab are relatively rare. One example of this approach is the
study by Coane and Balota (2009) that shows that lexical
decision latencies to words like ‘‘leprechaun” that are asso-
ciated with a particular holiday are faster and more accu-
rate when participants are tested around the time of year
that the relevant holiday occurs. In addition, Coane and
Balota (2011) have shown that sematic priming can be
observed for pairs of items that will likely have co-
occurred within participants recent linguistic experience
(e.g., for words that occur within movie titles). Taken
together these previous experiments indicate that particu-
larwords, and the connections between them, may become
more accessible on the basis of real life experiences.
Here we explore whether particular word meanings also
become more accessible. Specifically, we focus on recre-
ational rowers who have learned new rowing-specific
meanings for relatively common words. For example, a
novice rower will quickly learn that the words ‘‘square”
and ‘‘feather” refer to a position of the oar, while the word
‘‘crab” refers to an (often catastrophic) error in which their
blade is pulled down into the water. We assume that expo-
sure to the non-rowing meanings will be relatively con-
stant across the group of rowers, and so any differences
between the rowers’ preferences will largely be driven by
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approach to determine which specific aspects of their row-
ing experience predict their overall preferences for these
rowing-related meanings. In particular we assess whether
these preferences are driven by (i) relatively recent rowing
experience within the past week, (ii) medium-term experi-
ence over the previous weeks/months, or (iii) their longer-
term experience that builds up over years. Finally we will,
as in Experiment 1, assess whether age plays a critical role
in modulating the effects of experience on lexical
preferences.
The use of rowers as the target population has several
advantages compared with other groups with specialised
vocabulary. First, rowing has a relatively large set of these
critical words which have both a relatively common non-
rowing meaning and a meaning that is specific to rowing
(e.g., ‘‘square”, ‘‘finish”, and ‘‘gate”). Also, unlike other more
common sports (e.g., football), these rowing terms have
not become part of everyday vocabulary. Coverage of this
sport on television in the UK is minimal and so the major-
ity of these meanings are unlikely to be encountered by
either rowers or non-rowers outside of rowing training
sessions. Therefore, by obtaining detailed information
about the time spent rowing we can obtain a relatively
accurate estimate of an individual’s exposure to these
meanings. Finally, recreational rowers within any club vary
substantially in their current level of training including
individuals who row every day as well as those who only
row once a week (or less). This provides the necessary vari-
ability to assess, using regression analyses, the impact of
these different types of linguistic experience.
Materials and method
Participants
An email was sent to the captains of six rowing clubs in
Cambridge, England with which the first author (JMR) had
a previous connection, offering to pay the club £100 if 30 of
their members completed the web-based experiment, with
an additional bonus of £25 if 40 members took part. Three
of these clubs responded and were sent a web link to dis-
tribute to their members. One club was only for university
students, the other two were not associated with the univer-
sity. Of the 119 rowers who took part, 18 were excluded
from the analyses as they did not complete the experiment;
a further 14 were excluded because they indicated that they
were not fluent in English or were not native English speak-
ers. Of the remaining 87 rowers (61% female; aged 17–55;
mean age = 28.3 years, SD = 8.9 years), 12.6% considered
themselves to be bilingual and 85.1% were born in the UK.
Twenty-seven control participants with no rowing
experience were recruited (56% female; aged 19–48; mean
age = 30.1 years, SD = 9.2 years) via social networks. They
did not receive reward for their participation. 14.8% of
the controls considered themselves to be bilingual and
96.3% were born in the UK.
Materials
The 21 target ambiguous words (Appendix C) were
selected by one of the authors (JMR) who has 10 years
of rowing experience. The words have one dominantnon-rowing meaning that would be familiar to all partici-
pants plus an additional meaning that would be frequently
encountered within a recreational rowing environment.
Nineteen of the rowing-related words would be unlikely
to be encountered outside of a rowing context, but ‘‘bow”
and ‘‘stern”, which refer more generally to a part of a boat,
are also used outside of a rowing context. These were
included to maximise the number of stimuli with the
intention to remove them if the boat-related meanings
were very frequently generated by the non-rowing control
participants. An additional 80 filler words were selected to
have no association with rowing and to distract from the
primary aim of the experiment.
Procedure
An online survey tool (www.surveymonkey.co.uk) was
used to present the experiment. Participants were told that
the aim of the research was to discover the impact of
exercise on memory. This provided a plausible cover story
for the specific recruitment of rowers without making
them aware that they were being targeted specifically
because of their rowing experience. After indicating their
consent to participation, they provided basic demographic
information (age and gender), information about their
language background and about how often they exercised
(to maintain the cover story). They then completed the
main experimental task: word association.
Participants made word-associations to 101 words: 21
homographs with a rowing-related meaning and 80 fillers
(see Materials). Each word was visually presented, one at a
time, and they were instructed to type in the first word
that was related in meaning to the target word that came
to their mind. Due to the relatively large set of words to
be included in this experiment, and the corresponding
increase in experiment length, we did not include the
meaning verification task used in Experiment 1.
To maintain the cover story, participants were given a
short recognition memory test which consisted of 24
words; twelve of which had been in the previous word-
association task. Participants were then asked to state
what their main sport was and to answer a series of ques-
tions about their participation in this sport. It was assumed
that the majority of participants would respond that their
main sport was rowing and so this question aimed to gain
information about their rowing experience without reveal-
ing that that we were specifically recruiting rowers. They
were asked (i) how long they had participated in this sport
(years); (ii) howmany days since they had last participated
in this sport; (iii) on average how many times per week
they had participated in this sport over the last month.
Participants were then asked what they thought the aim of
the study was. Finally, for each of the 21 rowing-related
words, the rowers (but not the non-rowing controls) were
asked to answer YES/NO to indicate whether they had heard
the word in their sport and knew its meaning.
Results
Knowledge of rowing words
These data were looked at prior to the analysis of the
word association responses in order to potentially exclude
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for predictor variables in multiple regression analyses.












Min 17 0 0.5 0
Max 55 42 20 21
Mean 27.5 5.9 6.0 2.2
SD 8.1 6.3 4.0 3.8
Experiment 4
Min 18 0 0 0 0 0
Max 76 60 10 7.8 n/a 8
Mean 34.8 8.9 3.2 2.6 3.9 1.6
SD 16.1 13.1 2.1 1.9 3.1 2.0
8 Eight of the rowers were removed from this regression analysis because
they gave a non-rowing sport as their main sport and so we had no
information about their rowing experience.
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knowledge. On average the rowers indicated that they
knew 93.5% of the words. Each rower knew more than
60% of the rowing words. Each rowing word was known
by more than 78% of the participants. No items/rowers
were excluded entirely from the word association analysis
(see following section for removal of items unknown to
individuals).
Word association
A semi-automated approach was used to determine
whether each word association response should be classi-
fied as ‘rowing’ or ‘non-rowing’. In the first instance, one
of the authors (BH) manually checked each response
and highlighted any responses that seemed to indicate
the retrieval of the rowing meaning. For example, for the
ambiguous word ‘‘square”, the responses ‘‘oar” and ‘‘blade”
were classified as a rowing response, whereas ‘‘rectangle”
and ‘‘circle” were not. Every such rowing-related response
was compiled into list of likely rowing response such that
any instances of the word ‘‘oar” for any other participant/
item would then automatically be coded as a rowing
response. This semi-automated approach was used to
increase the consistency of coding across items/partici-
pants. All responses that were automatically coded as
being a ‘rowing response’ were then manually checked
and in a few cases these decisions were overridden. For
example, while the response ‘‘race” was considered to be
a rowing response to the ambiguous target ‘‘bump”
(because the ‘‘bumps” are a type of rowing race), it was
not considered a rowing response in response to the
ambiguous target ‘‘finish”, because the rowing meaning
of this word is to do with the part of the rowing stroke
and not to do with racing. Where there was any uncer-
tainty in the coding this was discussed with a second
author (JMR) who had extensive rowing experience. In
any cases where coding was uncertain the default was to
code as ‘non-rowing’. All coding was done blind to whether
the data came from a rower or control.
For the rowers, these word association data were then
combined with the data from the rowing knowledge test
such that we removed any word association response to
a rowing word where that rower had indicated that they
did not know the rowing-related meaning. We then calcu-
lated (across both participants and items) the proportion ofthese ‘known meaning’ trials on which a rowing related
meaning was generated. As expected, the mean propor-
tion of rowing responses was substantially higher in the
rowers (M = 29.3%; SD = 17.3) compared with the controls
(mean = 0.7%; SD = 1.7). The non-zero score in the controls
reflects the fact four of the controls gave a boat-related
meaning for ‘‘stern”. Due to the differences in variability
in responses in the two groups, non-parametric tests were
used to confirm the significance of this difference (U1(114)
= 25.5, Z1 = 7.7, p < .001; Z1(21) = 4.0, p < .001). These initial
results confirm that the rowing meanings were sufficiently
dominant within the rowers that on a significant propor-
tion of trials (29.3%) the rowing meaning was the first
meaning to be retrieved, despite the fact that these mean-
ings are strongly subordinate or unknown for non-rowing
participants.
A simultaneous multiple regression analysis (N = 79)8
then explored the influence of a participant’s age and their
rowing experience on the word association performance.
We included a measure of long-term experience (number
of years of rowing experience), a measure of medium-term
experience (average weekly rowing frequency in previous
month), and a measure of recent experience (number of days
since they last rowed). Initial exploration of the data con-
firmed that the participants sampled varied substantially
on all four predictor variables (see Table 1).
On the basis of Experiment 1, all three measures of
experience were log-transformed. The inter-correlation
matrix with all predictor variables showed a significant
positive correlation between age and both an individual’s
long-term rowing experience (r = .464, p < .001) and a
negative effect their medium-term rowing frequency
(r = .432, p < .001), indicating that older rowers tend to
have rowed for longer but have rowed less over the past
months. Medium-term rowing frequency was also signifi-
cantly negatively correlated with how long since they
had rowed (r = .361, p = .001; more rowing by those
who had rowed more recently). As with Experiment 1,
there was no evidence of serious multi-collinearity in this
data (maximum VIF = 1.61).
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3.7, p = .01, R2 = 0.17). Age was a significant negative
predictor (b = .42, t(74) = 3.1, p = .002) such that older
individuals tended to retrieve a lower proportion of rowing
responses, whereas length of rowing experience had a
significant positive influence on the proportion of rowing
responses (b = .39, t(74) = 3.2, p = .002) such that rowers
with more overall rowing experience tended to provide a
higher proportion of rowing responses. The measure
of medium term rowing experience (rowing frequency
over the past month) was only marginally significant
(b = .25, t(74) = 2.0, p = .053), and surprisingly the mea-
sure of recent experience (days since they had rowed) was
a non-significant predictor (b = .14, t(74) = 1.2, p = .23).
The nature of the predicted effects of age and long-term
rowing experience are shown in Fig. 5.
Awareness of experiment aims
Most participants indicated that they believed the cover
story (46%) or gave either no answer or a very vague
answer to the question about the experiment aim (39%).
Only 12 of the 79 rowers included in the regression
analysis (15%) indicated that they thought the aim of the
experiment was related in any way to the presence of
sports-related words. The multiple regression analysis
reported above was repeated without these 12 partici-
pants. The significance levels were not changed by the
exclusion of these participants except that the marginal
effect of medium-term experience became significant









































Fig. 5. Experiment 3: Predicted values from regression analysis (solid
lines) as a function of variation in (i) number of years rowing experience
and (ii) participant age. In both cases these are plotted at median values
of other predicted variables. Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence
intervals for these predicted values.Discussion
Several intriguing findings have emerged from this
experiment, which suggests that age and long-term rowing
experience have the most salient effects on how readily
available the rowing meanings are to any given individual:
rowing meanings were more likely to be generated by row-
ers who had rowed for a long time and by those who had
gained this experience at a relatively young age. Impor-
tantly, although these two predictor variables are posi-
tively correlated (older rowers have typically rowed for
longer), their effects are in the opposite directions –whilst
older rowers tend (on average) to have rowed for longer,
they give fewer rowing responses than younger rowers
with similar amounts of experience. In contrast the effect
of medium-term experience was only marginal, and the
effect of recent experience was not significant.
One important issue is the extent to which these results
could be explained in terms of demand characteristics – is
it possible that the effects reflect the awareness of partici-
pants regarding the aim of the experiment and so have
modified their behaviour in order to conform to the exper-
imenter’s expectations? There are two reasons that this is
unlikely. First, the majority of participants reported no
awareness of the experiment aims, suggesting that the
cover story (that indicated they had been being recruited
for a more general study on the effect of exercise on mem-
ory) had been successful. In addition, the high proportion
of non-rowing fillers (80%) may have helped to distract
from the true aim of the experiment. On average each
rower only retrieved six rowing related meanings in
response to a total list of 101 words, which is likely to
explain their relatively low level of awareness. Second,
the key findings remained significant even in a subset anal-
ysis that excluded those participants that indicated even
partial awareness of the aims.
The most surprising aspect of these data, in the light of
the strong influence of recent performance on meaning
preferences that was seen in Experiments 1 and 2, is that
this experiment showed no significant effect of recent
experience. We therefore decided to pursue this recency
effect (or the lack of it) in more detail in Experiment 4.Experiment 4
The aim of this experiment was to follow up the non-
significant effect of recent experience observed in Experi-
ment 3. A similar web-based method was used, but we
obtained additional information about their recent experi-
ence by asking them to tell us about every occasion on
which they had rowed over the past week. This approach
provides a far richer data set and allows us to look for
effects not only of their most recent rowing episode, but
also of rowing episodes earlier in the week.Materials and method
Participants
35 rowing clubs throughout England, who did not par-
ticipate in Experiment 3, were emailed using the same
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from 188 participants from nine different clubs. We
excluded 39 participants who did not complete the whole
experiment, 2 participants who were under 17, and 21
participants who indicated that English was not their first
language or that they were not fluent in English. Of the
remaining 126 participants who were included (54%
female; aged 18–76; mean age = 34.5 years, SD = 15.9)
92% were born and raised in Britain.Materials
The stimuli for the word association task were the same
as in Experiment 3 (Appendix C), except that three of the
suboptimal ambiguous words were excluded to reduce
the length of the experiment: ‘‘stretcher” and ‘‘loom” had
relatively low performance in the rowing knowledge test
(<70%) indicating they were less frequently used by the
rowers, and ‘‘stern” was sometimes generated by
non-rowers indicating that it occurs relatively often in a
non-rowing context. Three non-rowing fillers were also
removed.9 Three rowers were excluded for suggesting that they had rowed 60
times per week on several months, this would be an extraordinary amount
of rowing activity and likely reflects a misreading of the question.
10 This data was only available for participants who had rowed within the
last week, for participants who had not rowed within this week we
assigned a value of 7 in this variable such that this measure of recent
experience was not likely to be sensitive to differences in recent experience
beyond the past seven days.Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 3, except that
we constructed seven different versions of the experiment
(one for each day of the week), such that participants could
select the version that was tailored to the day of the week
on which they performed the experiment. This made it
easier to ask questions about their recent rowing experi-
ence as we could refer to these days by their names. For
example a participant who completed the experiment on
a Sunday would be asked to tell us about whether they
had been rowing on ‘‘Today (Sunday)”, ‘‘Yesterday (Satur-
day)”, ‘‘Friday”, etc. (see Rowing habits section below).
The demographic questionnaire and the memory test were
the same as in Experiment 3. The word association task
and the rowing knowledge tasks were the same as in
Experiment 3 except for the removal of six words (see
Materials). The question about the experimental aims
was removed (on the basis of the results of Experiment
3) to compensate for the additional length of the ‘rowing
habits’ section.
Several important changes were made to the ‘rowing
habits’ part of the experiment. To avoid loss of data for
participants who did not consider rowing their main sport
we explicitly instructed participants to answer these ques-
tions about rowing. This was done after the word associa-
tion experiment so that it could not have biased these
critical responses. As in Experiment 3, participants were
then asked how long they had participated in this sport
(years). They were then given a grid of two hour time slots
for each of the preceding eight days (Before 6 am;
6–8 am . . . 8–10 pm; after 10 pm) and were asked to tick
all the time slots in which they had been rowing. There
was a ‘‘no rowing” option for any participant who had
not rowed in the past week. They were then asked to type
in how often they had been rowing on average per week
for each of the previous 10 months. All participants com-
pleted the experiment in November and they were asked
to give this information for January through to October.Results
Word association
Word association responses were coded using the same
semi-automated procedure as for Experiment 3, except
that the list of rowing responses from Experiment 3 was
used as the starting list for automatically coding rowing
responses with additional new rowing responses being
added as required. As before, all individual responses that
were coded as ‘rowing’ were manually checked and all
coding was done blind to information from other variables.
A simultaneous multiple regression (N = 123)9 explored
the influence of the five potential predictor variables. Four of
these variables were the same as in Experiment 3: age
(years), and the measure of longer-term experience (number
of years rowing experience), medium-term rowing experi-
ence (weekly rowing over the past month) and recent row-
ing experience (days since last rowed).10 We also included a
new measure of their medium-term rowing experience:
their average weekly rowing frequency over the previous
9 months, and a new measure of the recent rowing experi-
ence: the number of times they had rowed in the previous
week. As in Experiment 3, all the predictor variables related
to rowing experience were log-transformed.
The two measures of medium-term frequency (fre-
quency over the past month and over the past nine
months) were very highly correlated (r = .57, p < .01), and
so to avoid problems of collinearity only the measure with
the higher raw correlation with word association perfor-
mance was included in the regression (frequency over
the past nine months). Likewise the two measures of
recent experience were very highly correlated (r = .80,
p < .001) and so only rowing frequency over the past week
was included. The final set of four predictor variables
showed the following significant inter-correlations. Age
was significantly positively correlated with long-term
experience (r = .57, p < .001), medium-term experience
(r = .29, p = .001) and recent experience (r = .28,
p = .001), such that older rowers had rowed for longer
and had rowed more often over the past nine months,
but had rowed less often over the past week. (This
counter-intuitive pattern of results may be explained by
the fact that November is (on average) a relatively quiet
period for the older non-university club rowers compared
with the younger university club rowers). In addition,
long-term rowing experience was positively correlated
with medium-term experience (r = .39, p < .001), and
medium-term experience was positively correlated with
recent experience (r = .44, p < .001). Despite these intercor-
relations there was no evidence of serious multi-
collinearity in this final set of predictor variables (maxi-
mum VIF = 2.00). A simultaneous multiple regression




























Fig. 6. Experiment 4: Proportion of rowing responses as a function of
recent rowing experience.
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significant result (F(4,118) = 6.3, p < .001, R2 = 0.18). As in
Experiment 3, although age and overall rowing experience
in years were positively correlated with each other, their
influences on word associations were in opposite direc-
tions. Age had a non-significant negative effect (b = .20,
t = 1.6, p = .102; more rowing responses from younger
participants), whereas long-term experience positively
predicted rowing responses (b = .28, t = 2.5, p = .01, more
rowing response from rowers with longer experience). As
in Experiment 3, the effect of medium-term rowing expe-
rience did not significantly predict rowing responses
(p > .5). In contrast to Experiment 3, the improved measure
of recent experience had a significant positive effect
(b = .25, t = 2.3, p = .021).
An additional aim of this experiment was to explore in
more detail the impact of very recent rowing experience.
We therefore classified participants (N = 121)11 on the
basis of their recent experience into four categories: (i) peo-
ple who had rowed on the same day as the experiment
(N = 24), (ii) people who had rowed on the day prior to the
experiment (but not on the day of the experiment, N = 8),
(iii) people who had rowed both on the same day and the
day prior (N = 11), (iv) people who had not rowed in the
last two days (N = 78). The means from these conditions
indicated that the rates of rowing responses were higher
for participants who had rowed on the day of the experi-
ment and participants who had rowed both that day and
the day before, compared with those individuals who had
only rowed the day before or had not rowed in the past
two days (Fig. 6). An ANCOVA which included age and
long-term rowing experience (log-transformed) as covari-
ates, showed a main effect of recent experience (F(3,115)
= 3.8, p = .001). (The covariate effect of long-term experience
was also significant (F(1,115) = 6.4, p = .012), whereas the
effect of age in this reduced subset was not significant
(p > .1)). The complete set of pairwise comparisons between
each of the four groups (using a Bonferroni corrected signif-
icance level of p < .008) confirmed that people who had not
rowed in the past two days differed significantly from those
who had only rowed today (p < .001), and from those who
had rowed both today and yesterday (p = .002), but not from
those who had only rowed yesterday (p = .55). The compar-
isons between the three groups of recent rowers showed
that the group who only rowed yesterday was significantly
different to the group who only rowed today (p = .002),
and was marginally different to the group who rowed both
today and yesterday (p = .01), but that these two latter
groups did not differ from each other (p = .88). In summary,
these results indicate differences between those individuals
who had rowed today and those who had not, but no addi-
tional effects of having rowed yesterday.
Finally, although the data concerning the time of day at
which participants had rowed was not included in the
analysis due to a lack of variance across participants, this
data indicates that the two groups of rowers who had11 Six participants were not categorised on this variable, because they had
incorrectly selected the wrong version of the experiment, (i.e. their time of
completion was inconsistent with the survey version) making this data
unreliable.rowed ‘today’ had median delay between their rowing
training and them taking part in experiment of approxi-
mately 8 h (median rowing slot was 6–8 am; median time
at which the experiment was started was 2.50 pm). Thus
the effect of having rowed ‘today’ has had an effect on their
performance several hours after this experience.General discussion
In this study, we investigated whether adult listeners
align their lexical–semantic representations to previous
experiences. To this aim, four experiments were conducted
to determine how both recent and longer-term experi-
ences with word meanings influence their accessibility.
While the overall frequency with which a word meaning
occurs in the language as a whole has long been considered
to be a key factor that determines the accessibility of word
meanings (Twilley & Dixon, 2000; Vitello & Rodd, 2015),
the role of recent and medium-term experience was far
from clear. Experiment 1 emphasised the importance of
very recent experience on how words are interpreted.
Listeners heard the critical ambiguous word primes (e.g.,
‘‘ACE”) once or twice within fully disambiguating para-
graph contexts as part of a radio programme. This brief
and relatively naturalistic experience with the words
influenced how listeners interpreted these ambiguous
words when they were presented during a subsequent
web-based word-association experiment (without disam-
biguating context). Those participants who had listened
to the critical radio programme very recently were more
likely to interpret these words in a way that was consistent
with the word meaning that was used in the radio
programme (e.g., ‘‘ACE-tennis” vs. ‘‘ACE-card”), compared
to participants who either did not listen to the programme
or who had waited several hours/days before taking part in
the experiment. This effect of recent experience was repli-
cated, within participants, in a lab-based setting in Exper-
iment 2. We refer to this change in meaning preference on
the basis of recent experience with a specific ambiguous
word as ‘word-meaning priming’ (Rodd et al., 2013).
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word meanings within conversations/narratives, this
priming effect is likely to have a strongly beneficial effect
on listeners’ ability to deal with ambiguous words in
everyday life by boosting the availability of these meanings
that they are more likely to encounter in the near future.
In both Experiments 1 and 2, this word-meaning prim-
ing effect was strongly modulated by the delay between
prime and target. In Experiment 1, priming was largest
for those participants who started the experiment very
soon after hearing the prime paragraphs. This priming
effect declined rapidly: after a 6 min delay the estimated
priming magnitude was 6.2% (see Fig. 2), but this priming
effect reduced to just 1% after a delay of about 3 h. Consis-
tent with this, Experiment 2 found a significant decline of
priming from 15% after 1 min to 8% after 20 min. Both
experiments also indicate that this decay is non-linear
such that the rate of decline reduces with time: in Experi-
ment 1 a logarithmic decay function provided the best fit,
while Experiment 2 found that in contrast with the signif-
icant decline seen in the first 20 min after the prime, there
was no significant decline between 20 and 40 min, sug-
gesting that the magnitude of priming becomes more
stable during this period.
In contrast to these first two experiments, which
investigated the effect of just one or two encounters with
a word meaning over a very short delay, Experiments 3
and 4 studied the impact of more substantial exposure to
rowing-related word meanings during the rowing
activities of recreational rowers. Experiment 4 found that
the tendency of recreational rowers to spontaneously
generate rowing-related interpretations for words like
‘‘square” and ‘‘feather” was strongly influenced by their
most recent rowing experience: those rowers who had
not rowed on the same day as the experiment retrieved
just 11% of rowing responses, but this increased to 24% in
the rowers who had been rowing earlier that day and
who had likely heard multiple instances of the target
words. This proportional increase of 122% in the rate of
rowing responses is particularly striking given that this
group of ‘same day’ rowers had a median delay between
their rowing experience and the experiment of 8 h. In
contrast to this large effect of ‘same day’ rowing, their
performance was not affected by whether or not they
had rowed the previous day.
However, with respect to the rowing experiments
(Experiments 3 and 4), one important caveat must be kept
in mind: due to the naturalistic nature of the experiments,
it remains somewhat uncertain exactly what aspects of
their rowing experience are driving the observed changes
in meaning preferences. Our preferred interpretation is
that these changes in meaning preferences are a result of
encountering the specific words used in this experiment
earlier within the rowing environment. The majority of
the words used in the experiment are words that we would
expect to be encountered on the vast majority of rowing
training episodes as they form a core part of the rowing
vocabulary used both by coxes and coaches during training
as well as by all participants discussing the training plan
both before and after they get on the water. However,
due to the fact that we could not monitor the languageuse during training, we cannot rule out the possibility that
(particularly for the same-day rowing effects) the changes
in their interpretations of the words are (in part) being dri-
ven by some more generic effect of the rowing experience.
For example, it may be that the experience of being in a
rowing environment has activated a cluster of semantically
related word meanings, including those that were not
specifically heard during the rowing episode and that all
rowing-related word meanings are boosted by this experi-
ence. The latter account, which is akin to a semantic prim-
ing account, would make the prediction that priming could
be observed even for those rowing terms that were not
encountered. We suggest that this explanation is unlikely.
Semantic priming effects have not been reported in the
literature at such long delays, and we have previously
shown that word-meaning priming is more long-lived than
semantic priming (Rodd et al., 2013). Future studies look-
ing at this issue will need to use carefully designed novel
paradigms that combine the naturalistic elements of this
approach with a greater degree of experimental control
over the priming phase of the experiment to explore
whether experiences such as going rowing, which usually
last for over an hour, can produce sufficiently long-lived
semantic priming effects that can drive relatively long-
term changes to meaning preferences.
In addition to these findings that recent (same-day)
experience can influence the interpretation of ambiguous
words, Experiments 3 and 4 also emphasised the impor-
tance of longer-term experience on how individuals inter-
pret words. In both these experiments we found that the
tendency to retrieve rowing-related meanings increased
as a function of the number of years that they had been
rowing, indicating that their experiences had had a cumu-
lative effect on their overall preferences. Surprisingly, in
both Experiments 3 and 4 there was no additional effect
of medium-term rowing experience – there was no signif-
icant effect of the average rowing frequency over either the
last month (Experiment 3) or the last 9 months (Experi-
ment 4).
Taken together, these results suggest that our most
recent (i.e. same day) linguistic experience can have a very
large effect on how we interpret ambiguous words. In the
case where this experience comprises just one or two
instances of the ambiguous word (Experiments 1 and 2)
the increases can be relatively modest and fast fading,
but when participants repeatedly hear these words within
their usual natural context (Experiment 4), the effects of
this experience can be large and can last for several hours.
However the absence of any effect of linguistic experience
from the previous day or of average exposure over the
preceding months (Experiments 3 and 4) suggests that
the long-term changes that are produced by many years
of linguistic experience develop very slowly and incremen-
tally over time.
These changes in meaning preferences are important as
they are predicted to directly affect the ease with which
these meanings can be processed within sentence con-
texts. For example, in Experiment 4 we found that having
rowed earlier that day produced an absolute increase of
12% in the retrieval of rowing related meanings, such that
participants were more than twice as likely to generate the
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previously discussed, current models (e.g., the reordered
access model, Duffy et al., 1988, 2001) predict that these
changes can have clear impact on the ease with which
these meanings can be processed within sentences con-
texts. In particular, the models predict a strong benefit
for those words for which priming can cause a moderately
subordinate meaning (e.g., ‘‘slide”; dominance = 25%) to
become equally preferred to the alternative non-rowing
meaning. It is less clear what impact word-meaning prim-
ing might have on comprehension of strongly subordinate
word meanings (e.g., the rowing meaning of ‘‘square”, with
a dominance of 5%). Even after priming such meanings are
likely to remain subordinate, and therefore are predicted to
remain relatively difficult to access due the presence of a
dominant competitor meaning.
In addition to providing insights about the time-course
with which experience can affect the interpretation of
ambiguous words, Experiment 1 showed that word-
meaning priming occurs with equal magnitude regardless
of whether the speaker used in the test phase was the same
as in the prime phase. For example, hearing the BBC radio
presenter Jenni Murray use the word ‘‘ace” to refer to a ten-
nis serve during the prime phase increased participants’
tendency to interpret the word ‘‘ace” in this way in the test
phase regardless of whether they were hearing the word
spoken by her or by a different radio presenter, Edward
Stourton. This absence of priming same-speaker advantage
was even seen for the subset of participants who indicated
that they had recognised the speaker that they heard dur-
ing the word association task. This finding is consistent
with the results of Rodd et al. (2013; Experiment 3), who
found a similar null effect of a voice-change manipulation
in a lab-based priming experiment using unfamiliar
speakers.
A final key finding from these experiments is that the
degree to which participants change their preferences for
individual word meanings is modulated by age. In Experi-
ment 1, the short-term word-meaning priming effect was
significantly larger for younger participants, and in Exper-
iments 3 and 4 regression analyses, which took into
account the individuals’ rowing experience, showed that
this experience had a larger effect on performance in
younger participants. (This effect was significant in Exper-
iment 3 and marginal in Experiment 4.) There are a host of
possible explanations for these age effects. One intriguing
possibility is that this finding reflects a more general
phenomenon whereby the plasticity of lexical–semantic
representations declines with age such that these repre-
sentations become increasingly stable over time. Such an
explanation is closely linked to explanations of the age-
of-acquisition effects seen on a range of verbal and non-
verbal tasks (Ellis & Lambon Ralph, 2000; Lambon Ralph
& Ehsan, 2006). However, the complex patterns of results
concerning how age can impact on perceptual learning to
speech stimuli (see Scharenborg & Janse, 2013, for a recent
review) suggests that any effect of age on this form of
lexical–semantic retuning is likely to be complex, with
multiple contributory factors. In particular, it is important
to assess the extent to which these age effects may arise
indirectly as a consequence of other age-related changes.While hearing loss in older adults may reduce the effi-
ciency of linguistic input (and hence word-meaning prim-
ing), we reasoned that this is an unlikely contributor to the
age-related priming reduction we observed as, for
instance, participants in Experiment 3 (aged 17–55) were
below the age at which age-related hearing loss usually
has a substantial impact (Van Rooij, Plomp, & Orlebeke,
1989). More likely candidates that may underlie that age-
related reduction in priming include attention and mem-
ory factors: as people age, their attention and memory
functions decline, rendering them less efficient in compre-
hending linguistic input and thus leading to reduced word-
meaning priming. In addition, in the case of Experiments 3
and 4 it is possible that the qualitative nature of the
linguistic experience may be changing with age, such that
younger rowers’ rowing environment is more verbally rich
than the environment of older rowers. Therefore, while
these data provide clear indications that there are age-
related changes in how older listeners make use of their
everyday linguistic input, they do not yet reveal the precise
mechanism(s) by which these age-related changes arise.
Future lab-based experiments are clearly needed to disen-
tangle these potential contributory factors.
Taken together these data about the time-course of
word-meaning priming, the absence of a same-speaker
advantage, and the modulatory effect of age provide
important insights into the underlying mechanism(s) of
word-meaning priming. Any plausible account must
accommodate the finding that (i) there is a very large
short-lived component that fades rapidly within the first
40 min after an encounter with the ambiguous word but
that is not affected by a change in speaker identity, (ii)
the impact of these encounters can last several hours,
and (iii) there is an incremental effect of exposure that
builds up across our lifetimes. We suggest that this con-
stellation of findings may prove relatively challenging for
current models to accommodate. At first glance, dis-
tributed connectionist models of how ambiguous words
are represented and processed (e.g., Joordens & Besner,
1994; Kawamoto, Farrar, & Kello, 1994; Rodd, Gaskell, &
Marslen-Wilson, 2004) seem well placed to accommodate
such priming effects due to their use of a learning algo-
rithms. For example, in Rodd et al.’s (2004) model, when-
ever the form of an ambiguous word is encountered, this
activation feeds forward to activate the semantic units that
are associated with its meanings. Initially, this pattern of
semantic activation corresponds to a blend (or mixture)
of its two meanings, but the recurrent connections
between the individual semantic units then ‘clean up’ this
activation to ensure that the network eventually settles
into a pattern of activation that corresponds to one of its
known meanings. Within this framework, any experience
with one of the meanings would strengthen the connec-
tions between its phonological/orthographic units and its
semantic units such that when the model next encounters
the word’s form there is an increased probability of it set-
tling into the recently encountered meaning. In addition,
equivalent changes to the connections within the semantic
layer could potentially make the attractor basin for that
meaning more stable, relative to the alternative unprimed
meaning. However, while such a connectionist model can
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very general sense, substantial modifications to the learn-
ing algorithm may well be needed to accommodate the
time-course with which word-meaning priming decays:
these models do not inherently contain any mechanism
by which changes to connection strengths on the basis of
recent experience vary as a function of time per se. One
possibility is that the decay function could arise purely
due to interference from intervening encounters with
other unrelated words: each such encounter would result
in weight changes, which could potentially influence even
apparently unrelated words because these may share some
connections within the highly interconnected distributed
network. But in our view it is far from clear that interfer-
ence effects of this type can necessarily accommodate
the decay function we observed. Future experimental work
looking at whether this decay is driven by time per se or by
interference from other linguistic input, together with
computational simulations, is necessary to determine the
likely mechanism for the decay function seen in these data.
Future work must also consider the possibility that multi-
ple mechanisms are at work, such that the large by rela-
tively short-lived priming seen in Experiments 1 and 2
and the longer-term learning observed in Experiments 3
and 4 are driven by qualitatively different mechanisms.
Again such a finding cannot easily be accommodated by
current models. To address this issue, future experiments
should explore the different factors that might modulate
word-meaning priming at different time-courses.
Finally, these experiments illustrate the utility of rela-
tively large-scale experiments in which the variation in
participants’ experiences arises either due to natural vari-
ability in their linguistic experiences (Experiments 3 and
4) or is manipulated in a relatively naturalistic manner,
such as via a radio programme (Experiment 1). These exper-
iments were only possible due to the use of web-based data
collection procedures, which do not require participants to
come into the lab for testing. We are hopeful that future
studies which extend this approach to include more sensi-
tive reaction time measures may allow researchers to make
rapid process on these key theoretical issues.
In summary, the three large-scale web-based experi-
ments and one lab-based experiment reported here pro-
vide a novel demonstration that adult listeners adapt
their lexical–semantic representations to their most
recent, as well as longer-term, experience such that
recently encountered word meanings are subsequently
more readily available. As ambiguous words tend to have
the same meaning when occurring in the same context,
such lexical–semantic alignment with past experience
allows listeners and readers to more accurately and rapidly
select appropriate word meanings, thus facilitating lan-
guage comprehension fluency, as other forms of linguistic
alignment have been suggested to do (e.g., Pickering &
Garrod, 2004). More generally, these results require a fun-
damental shift in thinking away from the view that lexi-
cal–semantic representations are stable and fixed,
towards a more dynamic, experience-driven account, in
which they are viewed as highly fluid, flexible representa-
tions that are continually updated in order to optimise the
efficiency of comprehension.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A
Experiment 1 stimuli: Scripts used in prime stage in the
order that they were presented. Target ambiguous words
are underlined.
Mark hopes to become a professional tennis player. He
practises on court at his club with his coach most days. His
strongest weapon on court is his serve. He regularly gets
out of trouble in a match with an ace on his serve. In his
last match Mark saved three set points with an ace. (Spo-
ken by ES.)
Neil is in prison for fraud. He’d like to appeal against his
sentence, but does not have a strong case. Neil is finding
life in his cell very hard, but his sentence is nearly over.
His victims may decide to sue him, and he would find it
hard to be in the dock again at a civil case. (Spoken by JM.)
Grace is a keen musician and plays the piano, organ and
French horn. The organ that Grace plays in her local church
has a beautiful tone, especially for the bass notes and for
chords with a lower pitch. (Spoken by ES.)
Daisy is a weekly boarder at her school. The school prin-
cipal has let the pupils organise a ball at the end of term. The
principal has agreed to a medieval theme for the ball, so
Daisy and the other pupils will be dressing as knights and
princesses. Definitely no jeans allowed. (Spoken by JM.)
Appendix B
Experiment 2: Ambiguous words.
Appendix, Ball, Band, Bar, Bark, Bat, Bed, Blue/Blew,
Bonnet, Bow, Bowl, Box, Break, Bulb, Button, Cabinet, Calf,
Cap, Card, Case, Change, Chest, China, Coach, Cold, Craft,
Cricket, Cross, Cup, Deck, Draw/Drawer, Fan, Fence, Figure,
Flower/Flour, Gear, Glasses, Gum, Hair/Hare, Hand, Inter-
est, Iron, Issue, Jam, Joint, Key, Lace, Landing, Letter, Match,
Mark, Mould, Mouse, Nail, Night/Knight, Note, Organ, Palm,
Panel, Park, Pear/Pair, Pen, Pipe, Plug, Punch, Pupil, Racket,
Record, Ring, Sea/See, Sign, Sink, Skip, Spade, Speaker,
Spring, Staff, Step, Stitch, Straw, Strike, Sun/Son, Temple,
Toast, Trailer, Trunk, Watch, Wave.
Appendix C
Experiment 3 and 4 stimuli: Ambiguous words with a
rowing-related meaning. (Words in brackets were only
included in Experiment 3).
36 J.M. Rodd et al. / Journal of Memory and Language 87 (2016) 16–37Gate, (Stretcher,) Head, Scratch, Finish, Crab, Bump,
Stroke, Bow, Eight, (Stern,) Pot, Shell, Sweep, Square,
Feather, Blade, (Loom,) Slide, Catch, Collar.
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